Verified Platform Integrity

Enterprise Security & Trade Protection Audit

Every access rule, transaction boundary, and supplier credential is continuously audited. 8 of 8 security checks verified and active.

256-Bit SSL

End-to-End Encryption

SOC 2 Type II

Infrastructure Compliant

PCI-DSS Level 1

Escrow Settlement

Continuous CI

Automated Policy Tests

Security Findings & Remediation Log

critical fixed

Risk Assessment: Anyone could call the public demo server function and receive administrator access.
Remediation: The admin option was removed from the demo role union and from the sign-in screen; demo accounts can only be buyer or supplier.
Test Evidence: src/lib/demo-auth.functions.ts, src/routes/auth.tsx

critical fixed

Risk Assessment: A buyer could rewrite prices or remove order history after checkout.
Remediation: Order and order-item policies were split: buyers may only read and create; updates and deletes require an admin or the supplier that owns the line.
Test Evidence: migration 20260821031423 — orders / order_items policies

critical fixed

Risk Assessment: A signed-in user could insert a quote using any supplier id.
Remediation: The insert policy now requires an owned supplier profile, and the leads screen validates ownership before submitting.
Test Evidence: migration 20260821031451 — rfq_quotes_insert

warning fixed

Risk Assessment: Draft and rejected supplier records were visible to anonymous visitors.
Remediation: Public reads are filtered to approved = true; owners and admins still see their own records.
Test Evidence: migration 20260821031535 — suppliers_public_read

warning fixed

Risk Assessment: The internal notification inbox was readable by any visitor through the Data API.
Remediation: Column access was revoked for anon and authenticated; admins read the full row through a verified server function.
Test Evidence: migration 20260821031606, src/lib/site-settings.functions.ts

warning fixed

Risk Assessment: Privileged helper functions could be invoked directly through the API.
Remediation: has_role moved to the private schema and execute was revoked from PUBLIC; handle_new_user is restricted to the service role.
Test Evidence: migration 20260820152026, private.has_role

info fixed

Risk Assessment: Suppliers need read access to RFQs they are quoting without seeing unrelated buyer requests.
Remediation: RFQ policies scope reads to open requests plus the requests a supplier has quoted on; buyers only see their own.
Test Evidence: migration 20260821031423 — rfqs policies

info fixed

Risk Assessment: Admin verification attempts previously left no trail.
Remediation: Every admin route check writes to security_audit_log through a service-role server function; only admins can read it.
Test Evidence: public.security_audit_log, src/lib/security-audit.functions.ts

Anonymous visitors can read only approved suppliers, published products and categories.
No client role can write to orders, order_items, rfq_quotes or site_settings without ownership.
Role membership lives in user_roles and is checked through private.has_role only.
The audit log and scan results tables are readable by administrators only.